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I. Elimination of Cost Accounting Standards Exemption for Contracts and
Subcontracts Performed Entirely Outside the United States
On August 10, 2011, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), Cost Account-
ing Standards (CAS) Board, issued a final rule eliminating the CAS exemption for con-
tracts and subcontracts executed and performed entirely outside the United States, its
territories, and its possessions.' The change was effective October 11, 2011, eliminating
the "overseas exemption" formerly contained at 48 C.F.R. § 9903.201-1(b)(14). 2 After
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1. Cost Accounting Standards: Elimination of the Exemption From Cost Accounting Standards for Con-
tracts and Subcontracts Executed and Performed Entirely Outside the United States, its Territories, and
Possessions, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,365 (Aug. 10, 2011) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 9903) (hereinafter Elimina-
tion of Exemption).
2. Id.
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considering eliminating it in 20053 and deciding to keep it in 2008,4 the CAS Board was
finally directed by Congress to "review the inapplicability of the cost accounting stan-
dards, in accordance with existing exemptions, to any contract and subcontract that is
executed and performed outside the United States.. .'5 The exemption had existed since
1973.6
The CAS Board's three reasons for eliminating the exemption were: 1) lack of a statu-
tory basis; 2) lack of an accounting basis; and 3) no hardship from eliminating the exemp-
tion. 7 The statutory basis for the exemption originated from the fact that the Defense
Production Act, which was the statutory basis for the existence of the CAS Board at the
time, was only applicable to the United States, its territories and possessions, and the
District of Columbia.8 However, once the CAS Board was reestablished under the OFPP
Act, the applicability of the CAS was no longer statutorily limited to the United States.9
While this would not necessarily require the elimination of the exemption, it meant that
the exemption was no longer required, thus enabling its elimination.
As for an accounting basis, with little analysis or further explanation other than "the
place of contract execution and performance is not germane to the fundamental require-
ments and practices set forth in CAS," the CAS Board rejected the argument that differ-
ences between U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) justified the exemption.10
The exemption's scope was narrow and its elimination will have similarly narrow impli-
cations, however this change is significant for those foreign concerns that will no longer
be exempt from the CAS.11 The change means that, absent another applicable exemption,
contractors performing entirely outside the United States will, at a minimum, now be
subject to CAS 401-Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating and Reporting Costs, 12
and CAS 402-Consistency in Allocating Costs Incurred for the Same Purpose. 13 It also
means foreign concerns receiving a CAS-covered contract or subcontract of $50 million
or more, or those that received a net of $50 million or more in CAS-covered contracts in
3. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy; Cost Accounting Standards Board; CAS Exemption for Con-
tracts Executed and Performed Entirely Outside the United States, Its Territories and Possessions, 70 Fed.
Reg. 53,977 (Sept. 13, 2005) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 9904).
4. See Cost Accounting Standards Board (CAS) Exemption for Contracts Executed and Performed
Outside the United States, Its Territories, and Possessions, 73 Fed. Reg. 8,259 (Feb. 13, 2008) (to be codified
at 48 C.F.R. pts. 9901 and 9903).
5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 823(a), 122 Stat.
4356, 179 (2008).
6. Elimination of Exemption, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,365 (citing Defense Procurement Circular No. 115
(Sept. 24, 1973)).
7. Id. at 49,366.
8. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S,C. § 2163 (1973).
9. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 1501 (2011).
10. Elimination of Exemption, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,366.
11. See id.
12. See Cost Accounting Standard-Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating, and Reporting Costs, 48
C.F.R. § 9904.401 (1992).
13. See id. § 9904.402.
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their prior accounting period, will need to accomplish a disclosure statement, the form for
which is currently only available in English. 14
II. Prohibition on Interrogation of Detainees by Contractor Personnel
In the wake of alleged abuses against Abu Ghraib prisoners by contractor interro-
gators, 15 onJuly 25, 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) published a final rule imple-
menting Section 1038 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2010.16 Section 1038 prohibits contractors from interrogating detainees that are under
DoD control, unless the Secretary of Defense has waived the prohibition due to U.S.
national security interests. 17 The final rule reflected no changes from the interim rule,
which DoD published on November 3, 2010.
Section 1038 requirements are incorporated into the Defense Federal Acquisition Reg-
ulation Supplement (DFARS) at DFARS 237.173 and a new DFARS clause 252.237-
7010.18 Although contractors are prohibited from interrogating detainees, the DFARS
permits a contractor to provide interrogation support such as training, advising, and inter-
pretation, provided the contractor meets DoD criteria.' 9
Key definitions in the DFARS were the subject of public comment with respect to the
new rule. For example, DFARS 237.173-2 defines "detainee" as "any person captured,
detained, held, or otherwise under the effective control of DoD personnel (military or
civilian) in connection with hostilities." 20 This includes, but is not limited to, enemy pris-
oners of war, civilian internees, and retained personnel.2' One commenter was concerned
that the term "hostilities" in the detainee definition was too vague. 22 DoD responded that
this definition of detainee was derived from the definition in DoDI 2310.01E, the Depart-
ment of Defense Detainee Program.23 According to the DoD, DoDI 23 10.01E "applies
during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other mili-
tary operations." 24 The DoD determined that DoDI 2310.01E provides sufficient clarifi-
cation and thus made no change.25
14. Contract Coverage-General Requirements, 48 C.F.R. § 9903.202-1(b)(1) & (2); see also FORM CASB
DS-I (REV 2/96), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/casbds-
l.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657
F. Supp. 2d 700 (D. Va. 2009).
16. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Prohibition on Interrogation of Detainees by
Contractor Personnel (DFARS Case 2010-D027), 76 Fed. Reg. 44,282 (July 25, 2011) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pts. 237 & 252).
17. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1038(a), 1038(d)(1),
123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
18. Prohibition on Interrogation of Detainees by Contractor Personnel, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,282.
19. Id.
20. Prohibition in Interrogation of Detainees by Contractor Personnel, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,633 (Nov. 3, 2010)
(to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 237.173-2).
21. Id.
22. See Prohibition on Interrogation of Detainees by Contractor Personnel, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,282.
23. Id. at 44,282-83.
24. Id. at 44,283.
25. Id.
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I1. 1-129 Requirements - Employers of Non-Immigrant Workers Required
to Certify Compliance with ITAR and EAR Deemed Export Rules
Beginning on February 20, 2011, a new "deemed export" certification requirement
went into effect for employers petitioning for several visa categories, including a non-
immigrant H-1B, H-lB1(Chile/Singapore), L-1, or 0-1 employment visa. 26
Under the new certification requirement, employers must certify whether a license is
required under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) or the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for any technology or technical data they intend to release to
the prospective foreign national employee.2 7 The EAR control the export of so-called
"dual use" items,28 including hardware, software, and technical data that have both com-
mercial and military applicability, while the ITAR control the export of defense articles,
related technical data, and defense services.29 The new form makes export controls an
explicit part of the immigration application process for the first time. 30
Specifically, U.S. employers petitioning for an applicable visa category must now certify
that
[w]ith respect to the technology or technical data the petitioner will release or other-
wise provide access to the beneficiary ...it has reviewed the ...EAR[] and
the ... ITAR[] and has determined that:
1. A license is not required from the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S.
Department of State to release such technology or technical data to the foreign per-
son; or
2. A license is required from the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S. Depart-
ment of State to release such technology or technical data to the beneficiary and the
petitioner will prevent access to the controlled technology or technical data by the
beneficiary until and unless the petitioner has received the required license or other
authorization to release it to the beneficiary.31
This new certification requirement is intended to ensure that employers focus on the
so-called "deemed export rule" under the EAR and ITAR early in the employment pro-
cess. Under both sets of regulations, the transfer, release, or disclosure of technical data
to a citizen or national of a foreign country is deemed to be an export of technical data to
that person's country or countries of citizenship or nationality.32 The deemed export rule
applies differently under the EAR and the ITAR, and a slightly different licensing analysis
may need to be undertaken depending on the regulatory regime involved. 33 The Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, which administers the EAR, in most
cases views only the foreign person's most recently acquired country of citizenship or
26. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, Part 6,
available at http://www.uscis.gov/i-129.
27. Id.
28. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pts. 770-774 (2010).
29. See International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-130 (2011).
30. See Form 1-129, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4) (2010); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
33. See Deemed Export FAQs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECUR-
rry, http://www.bis.doc.gov/deemedexports/deemedexportsfaqs.html#5 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
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permanent residence as the destination country.34 The Department of State, Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which administers the ITAR, takes the position that
all prior countries of citizenship, nationality, or birth are considered destination countries
for export licensing purposes. 35
The new Form 1-129 creates challenges for employers in predicting the type of techni-
cal data to which an employee will have access during the course of his or her employ-
ment, as many employers are unable to determine the exact technologies to which an
employee will be exposed prior to the employee commencing employment. Even in cases
where an export license may not initially be required, the scope of the technical data to
which an employee may have access could expand, creating an export licensing require-
ment at a later date.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has not specified how it will use
the new data it is acquiring through the certifications. USCIS has not indicated, for ex-
ample, whether it will conduct a more extensive background check of an individual who is
expected to receive controlled technical data prior to granting a visa. 36 At a minimum,
U.S. government officials have said that the data collected by USCIS will be shared with
other U.S. government agencies. 37
Inaccurate certifications on Form 1-129 may expose employers to criminal liability.38
The employer is required to certify under penalty of perjury that the petition and the
evidence with it are true and correct to the best of the employer's knowledge. 39 The
knowing submission of false statements to the U.S. government may result in sanctions of
up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to five years, or both.4°
Substantial criminal and civil penalties, including jail time for willful violations, also
may be imposed under the relevant export control laws.4 ' Failure to comply with the
ITAR, including making unauthorized deemed exports to foreign national employees, may
result in civil fines of up to $500,000 per violation, and criminal penalties as high as $1
million and twenty years imprisonment per violation.42 Potential penalties under the EAR
can reach $250,000 per violation, and criminal penalties may be as high as $1 million and
twenty years imprisonment per violation.4 3 These types of penalties are atypical for immi-
gration violations, and highlight the significance of the new certification requirement.
The new certification requirement highlights the need for employers of foreign nation-
als to implement export compliance systems that enable early determination regarding the
need for a foreign national employee to receive deemed exports requiring a license. At the
same time, employers must be cognizant of maintaining compliance with workplace an-
tidiscrimination laws and policies. While information on citizenship and nationality can
be gathered on an as-needed basis to determine compliance with export controls, compa-
34. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
35. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.16.
36. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form 1-129 Instructions, Petition for a Nonimmigrant




40. See Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2010).
41. See 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2011); 15 C.F.R § 764.3 (2010).
42. See 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2011).
43. See 15 C.F.R § 764.3 (2010).
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nies should confirm that the process implemented to gather that information and the use
of the information after it is gathered is appropriate under U.S. law.
IV. Department of Defense Rule on Organizational Conflicts of Interest in
Major Defense Acquisition Programs
The DoD issued a final rule amending DFARS part 209. The new DFARS subpart
209.571 implemented section 207 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
(WSARA).44 WSARA required DoD "to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing
requirements for organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) by contractors in major defense
acquisition programs (MDAPs). '' 45
Although conflicts of interest issues exist government-wide, the new DFARS rule only
applies to MDAPs and pre-MDAPs. 46 An MDAP is defined as a non-classified program
that is estimated tocost $300 million or more for initial research, development, test, and
evaluation or estimated to have a total expenditure of $1.8 billion or more, including all
planned increments or spirals.47 Pre-MDAPs are defined as programs that are in "the
Material Solution Analysis or Technology Development Phases preceding Milestone B of
the Defense Acquisition System and [have] been identified to have the potential to become
a MDAP."48
The final rule requires DoD agencies to obtain advice on MDAPs and pre-MDAPs
from "objective and unbiased" sources. 49 There are a myriad of situations in which a
conflict of interest can arise, but typically conflicts arise where there is unequal access to
nonpublic information, biased ground rules, or impaired objectivity.50 In implementing
this rule, agencies are to resolve OCI issues in ways that promote competition and retain
DoD's access to the expertise and experience of qualified contractors. 51 Thus, agencies
can no longer apply "per se restrictions or limitations" and instead should resolve OCI
issues on an individual basis.5 2
44. Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 207, 123 Stat. 1704, 1728-30
(2009).
45. Id. at 1728.
46. Federal Acquisition Regulation; Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. 23236 (proposed
Apr. 26, 2011) (to be codified at FAR pt. 2-4, 7, 9, 11-16, 18, 37, 42, 52, and 53).
47. 10 U.S.C. § 2430 (Supp. 11 2009).
48. DFARS 209.571-1 (2010).
49. Id. at 209.571-3(a).
50. See Maden Technologies, B-298543.2, 2006 CPD § 167, at 6 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 30, 2006) (unequal
access to information arises "where a firm has access to nonpublic information as part of its performance of a
government contract and where that information may provide the firm a competitive advantage in a later
competition for a government contract"); Operational Resource Consultants, Inc., B-29913 1.1 et al., 2007
CPD § 38, at 5 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 16, 2007) (a biased ground rule "arises where a firm, as part of its perform-
ance of a government contract, has in some sense set the ground rules for the competition for another gov-
ernment contract by, for example, writing the [Statement of Work]"); Aetna Government Health Plans, Inc.,
B-254397 et. al., 95-2 CPD § 129, at 9 (Comp. Gen. July 27, 1995). (an impaired objectivity "arises where
there is a concern "that the firm's ability to render impartial advice to the government could appear to be
undermined by its relationship with the entity who's work product is being evaluated.").
51. DFARS 209.571-3(b) (2010).
52. Id.
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When identifying OCIs for MDAPs or pre-MDAPs, agencies are required to consider
whether: (1) the contractor "performing systems engineering and technical assistance,
professional services, or management support services" simultaneously owns a business
unit competing (or potentially competing) to perform as either a prime or supplier of a
major system for the same program; (2) the prime contractor intends to award a contract
for a major subsystem to its affiliated business unit, particularly for subcontracts for
software integration or development of proprietary software system architecture; and (3)
the contractor is performing a technical evaluation.5 3
Agencies can address OCIs through mitigation, which the rule suggests is the preferred
method for resolving OCI issues. The rule defines mitigation as "any action taken to
minimize an organizational conflict of interest."54 If the agency and the contractor agree
to resolve an OCI through mitigation, the rule requires an OCI mitigation plan that me-
morializes the "actions a contractor has agreed to take to mitigate a conflict." 55 This plan
must be incorporated into the contract.56 If the contractor cannot effectively mitigate the
OCI, the agency must use another approach to resolve the OCI, select another contractor,
or request a waiver.5 7 For acquisitions exceeding $1 billion, the agency must "brief the
senior procurement executive before determining that" the mitigation plan is
unacceptable.58
For contractors that provide systems engineering and technical assistance on an MDAP,
the final rule prohibits the contractor or its affiliate "from participating as a contractor or
major subcontractor in the development or production of a weapon system" under the
same program.59 The term "major subcontractor" was refined to mean a "subcontractor
that is awarded a subcontract that equals or exceeds [b]oth the cost or pricing data thresh-
old and 10 percent of the value of the contract under which the subcontracts are awarded;
or $50 million."60 DoD did establish limited exceptions to ensure that it has continued
access to advice on systems architecture and systems engineering matters from highly
qualified contractors. 61 As a result, the prohibition "does not apply if the head of the
contracting activity determines that ... DoD needs the domain experience and expertise
of the highly qualified, apparently successful" contractor and that the contractor "will be
able to provide objective and unbiased advice." 62
The new DFARS rule provides a strong path forward for agencies to address OCIs in
MDAPs, but several of the concerns expressed during the public comment period remain.
53. Id. at 209.571-6.
54. Id. at 209.571-4(a).
55. Id. at 209.571-4(b).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 209.571-4(c).
58. Id. at 209.571-4(d).
59. Id. at 209.571 - 7(b)(1). Systems engineering and technical assistance is defined as "a combination of
activities related to the development of technical information to support various acquisition processes." Id. at
209.571-1. Systems engineering is defined as an "interdisciplinary technical effort to evolve and verify an
integrated and total life cycle balanced set of system, people, and process solutions that satisfy customer
needs" while technical assistance means "the acquisition support, program management support, analyses,
and other activities involved in the management and execution of an acquisition program." Id.
60. Id. at 252.209-7009(a).
61. Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 207, 123 Stat. 1704, 1728-30
(2009).
62. DFARS 209.571-7(c) (2010).
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Despite the final rule's narrowed focus on MDAP OCI provisions, there are still concerns
that the rule does not achieve the overall objectives of WSARA, either because the pro-
posed coverage is too stringent or not sufficiently strong.63 The final rule also does not
address training and implementation despite several questions regarding whether con-
tracting officers are appropriately trained to effectively recognize and mitigate OCIs.64 In
particular, the rule provides minimal guidance to assist contracting officers in determining
when mitigation (over other methods of OCI resolution) should be used. 65 Furthermore,
the final rule does not require contractors to disclose OCIs prior to contract award and on
a continuing basis during contract performance, which makes it more difficult for con-
tracting officers to identify OCIs. 66 Based on these concerns, the new DFARS rule might
have unintended consequences in its implementation.
V. Changes in the Indian Defense Procurement Policy & Procedure
In February 2011,67 the Indian government announced increased defense spending in
line with its intention to modernize its armed forces, resulting in allocation of $37.3 bil-
lion towards defense procurement. 68 Spending on defense in India is governed by the
guiding principles of the Defense Procurement Procedure 2011 (DPP 2011), the latest
version of which was released by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) on December 27,
2010.69 The DPP has been revised six times since its release in 2001. The revisions of
2003 to 2009 provided for public accountability and increased transparency, but several
holes remained, necessitating the amendment in 2011.70 A few of the key changes intro-
duced in the DPP 2011 and the implications for foreign vendors are discussed below.
A welcome change has been made to Defense offsets under the DPP 2011. Defense
offsets are a form of counter-trade that requires a foreign vendor who has contracted with
the Indian government in excess of $58 billion to reinvest thirty percent of that amount.
The MOD insists that the reinvestment of the offset amount be in the defense sector.
Many foreign vendors faced problems in meeting their bffset obligations since foreign
direct investment in defense is limited to twenty-six percent. While the DPP has been
revised many times since 2001, this issue has only been substantively addressed by the
MOD under DPP 2011.
Answering the long-standing request of the foreign vendors, "civil aerospace," "internal
security," and "training" were added to the ambit of eligible products and services for
63. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,908-09 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be
codified at 48 C.F.R pt. 209, 252).
64. Id. at 81,912.
65. Id. at 81,911-12.
66. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 75 Fed. Reg. 20954 (proposed Apr. 22, 2010) (to
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 202-03, 212, 252).
67. See Key Features of Budget 2011-2012, Union Budget and Economic Survey, Government of India,
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2011-l2/bh/bhl.pdf.
68. See IANS, Union Budget 2011: 11 % hike in defence allocation, TIE TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 28, 2011, 2:04
PM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/union-budget-201 1/Union-Budget-2011-1 l-hike-in-de-
fence-allocation/articleshow/7594077.cms.
69. Defence Procurement Procedure - 2011, Minister of Defence, Government of India, http://
mod.nic.in/dpm/welcome.html.
70. See id. at 2.
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discharge of offset obligation. 71 The list of eligible offsets now covers almost all aspects of
civil aerospace (e.g., airframes, aero-engines, components, engineering, technical publica-
tions, and flying, and technical training).72 For internal security, a wide range of weapons
and services for counter-terrorist activities has been included.
The changes introduced have a dual impact on the domestic sector. Apart from broad-
ening the scope of offset activities and increasing vendor participation, it will also en-
courage the building up of the domestic civil aviation sector with indigenous defense
production capabilities for both internal security as well as the armed forces. It is also
pertinent to consider the possibility of over-pricing the offsets, specifically in relation to
offsets possible under services such as "training," which may have an adverse impact on
the ultimate objective.
As shipbuilding is a capital-intensive industry, several industry requests led to the crea-
tion of a separate chapter, Chapter 11, 73 in DPP 2011 specifically relating to naval acqui-
sitions and a separate procedure for designing, constructing, and acquiring ships. Chapter
III has undergone a sea change to incorporate competitive principles for procurement
from private, government-owned, and nominated shipyards.74 The new and improved
Chapter IR also provides a stepwise acquisition process, 75 including several clauses that
strengthen the contracting mechanisms with payments now linked to stages of construc-
tion. 76 With these changes, the MOD is attempting to meet the dual goals of promoting
development and increasing the competitive edge of the domestic shipbuilding industry
players, both private and public.
Several provisions of the acquisition procedure have been tweaked based on past exper-
iences and feedback to make the process more vendor-friendly and efficient. Vendors
whose contract values exceed $20 million are required to execute an Integrity Pact and
provide bank guarantees under the DPP. The Integrity Pact is essentially an undertaking
from the CEO of the vendor whereby the vendor warrants against using or employing
agents to influence the MOD's decision, and the bank guarantee acts as a deterrent. Pre-
viously, the bank guarantees under the Integrity Pact were required to be valid indefinitely
at the bidding stage, causing significant cost and inconvenience to vendors. Under the
DPP 2011, the Integrity Pact bank guarantee must be valid only until forty-five days after
the expiry of the commercial offer for all vendors, and until the completion of the contract
for the successful vendor. 77 Vendors were also required to furnish separate financial bonds
for performance of contract and warranty of equipment. This has now been clubbed
under a single bond for five percent of the contract value.78 These practical inputs will
substantially trim down the commercial quote of the vendors.
Since performance of defense procurement contracts takes a significant time, many for-
eign vendors suffered from fluctuations in foreign exchange. Consequently, Defense Pub-
lic Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) had a competitive price advantage. In an effort to create
71. See id. at 55-56.
72. Id. at 56-57.
73. Id. at 183.
74. Id. at 194.
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 197-200.
77. See Defense Procurement Procedure, Pre-Contracts Integrity Pact 8.3, supra note 69, at 117.
78. See id. art. iv, at 219.
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parity between the private sector and DPSUs, the exchange rate variation clause is now
applicable to all Indian vendors when they compete with their foreign counterparts under
the "Buy Global" category, which provides them the benefit of variation in foreign ex-
change. This clause provides for the mechanism of calculation of the variation in contract
price due to foreign exchange fluctuation. Furthermore, the base rate of Parliament
Street Branch of the State Bank of India, New Delhi has replaced the prime lending rate,
which is favorable to foreign vendors. 79
A stark change is the removal of the stringent provision which provided for blacklisting
of vendors in case of delay in delivery of equipment under fast-track procurement.
8 In-
stead, liquidated damages have been enhanced to ensure greater accountability on a ven-
dor and protect the interest of the MOD in case only one vendor can provide the
equipment.
The efforts of the MOD to tweak the DPP demonstrate its intention to develop and
modernize domestic defense capabilities and alleviate foreign vendors' offset concerns.
But a major remaining concern is the absence of a single window clearance system for
defense acquisitions. This suggestion has been made to the MOD time and again, and-if
heeded and implemented-would check the mammoth delays in acquisition, improvement
in formulation of qualitative requirements, trial and technical evaluations, as well as make
the process more transparent and vendor friendly. In sum, while the changes introduced
show the government has come a long way since the first version was released in 2001, the
amendments to the DPP are largely procedural in nature, and the impact may not be far
reaching.
VI. Changes to ITAR: A Shift Away from the "Place of Birth" Standard?
In a much anticipated final rule published on May 16, 2011, effective August 15, 2011,
the DDTC announced significant amendments to parts 124 and 126 of the ITAR.81
These changes permit dual national and third-country national employees of DDTC-
approved, non-U.S.-based8 2 end-users of United States Munitions List (USML) articles
(including technical data) to access such goods without the prior approval of DDTC.
Thus, the "place of birth standard" alone will no longer prohibit access to ITAR-con-
trolled articles by employees of non-U.S.-based entities.
The ITAR has a wide-reaching effect upon companies that produce or trade in regu-
lated defense and aerospace articles of U.S. origin. Export authorization or licensing is
required for all exports of USML goods or data, and non-U.S. recipients of USML goods
or data are subject to the controls imposed under the ITAR regime.8 3
79. See id. Guidelines of Protection of Exchange Rate Variation in Contracts, at 104-05.
80. See id. Fast Track Procedure 27, at 208.
81. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,174 (May 16, 2011) (to be codified at 22
C.F.R. pts. 120, 124, 126).
82. See definitions for "U.S. Person" and "Foreign Person" pursuant to 22 C.F.R. § 120.15 and 120.16,
respectively.
83. Canada is the only country subject to general export exemptions under 22 C.F.R. § 126.5, providing it
with license-free access to a limited range of USML articles and data. All other USML articles not subject to
the Canadian exemption or certain other limited exemptions are accessed through the process of applying for
separate export authorizations issued by DDTC (for example, the full range of Export Licenses, General
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The May 16, 2011 amendment to the ITAR is a component of the broader U.S. Export
Control Reform Initiative proposed by the Obama Administration in 2009. This particu-
lar regulatory change was instituted in an effort to address complaints from non-U.S.
trade partners regarding the "tremendous administrative burden" imposed upon end-users
of USML articles. 84 Similarly, U.S. manufacturers and exporters had complained that the
operative standards placed U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage. The restrictive
application of ITAR provisions to citizens with dual nationality, as well as third-country
nationals employed by non-U.S.-based firms, was a significant issue. Under the previous
ITAR interpretation, DDTC employed the "place of birth standard" in determining
whether a foreign person working in a foreign country may have access to unclassified
USML articles of U.S. origin. Because the ITAR treated a transfer of defense articles to a
national of a country as the equivalent of a transfer to that country itself, dual nationals or
third-country nationals of ITAR-prohibited countries 85 were effectively barred from han-
dling ITAR-controlled goods or technical data. In order to maintain compliance with the
standard, as interpreted and applied by DDTC, businesses were forced to limit access to
ITAR-controlled articles to those employees who were not dual or third-country nationals
of prohibited countries. As a result, complying with "place of birth" restrictions often
meant that non-U.S.-based corporations risked complaints under domestic human rights
laws and regulations.
The critical amendments under ITAR section 126.18(c) now establish two separate
processes by which non-U.S.-based companies employing dual nationals or third-country
nationals are able to access U.S.-origin USML articles and data. Additionally, the
amended policy extends the definition of "regular employee" to include workers who have
long-term employment relationships with licensed end-users. Accordingly, a new defini-
tion of "regular employee" was added under section 120.39.86 The new definition in-
cludes permanent employees and full-time contractors who work exclusively for the end-
user.
The first process available pursuant to ITAR section 126.18(c)(2) permits access where
an ITAR-approved, non-U.S.-based business entity institutes a program that screens em-
ployees against set criteria, with the objective of determining whether the employee is
likely to divert ITAR-controlled articles. Employees of approved foreign users/licensees
must be vetted to reduce the risk of diversion of U.S. ITAR-controlled material. Once an
employee is cleared under the "risk of diversion" assessment, employers need not distin-
guish them as dual or third-country nationals. DDTC presumes a risk of diversion for
individuals who have "substantive contacts" with persons from proscribed countries, un-
less otherwise determined. Factors considered by DDTC in assessing whether "substan-
tive contacts" exist include, inter alia, regular travel to a proscribed country, demonstrated
allegiance to that country, maintenance of business relationships with individuals in a pro-
Correspondence Letters, Technical Assistance Agreements, Manufacturing License Agreements, and Ware-
house and Distribution Agreements).
84. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 28,175.
85. See 22" C.F.R. § 126.i(a) for the full list of prohibited countries.
86. U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Guidelines and Implementation Considera-
tions: Dual/Third-National Rule, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Implementation], available at http://www.pmddtc.
state.gov/licensing/documents/D-TCN-PolicyImplementationFinal.pdf.
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scribed country, or maintenance of a residence in a proscribed country.87 Thus, associa-
tion with a proscribed country has not been eliminated as a basis for barring access to
USML-controlled goods. Further, in instances where a foreign entity requests DDTC to
vet specific individuals under licences or agreements, DDTC will consider country of
origin or birth.88
ITAR section 126.18(c)(1) provides that the second process to "clear" dual and third-
country nationals is by providing them "a security clearance approved by the host nation
government for its employees." While this option may simplify the process of obtaining
access to ITAR-controlled goods for those employees who already possess such clearance,
it is unlikely to constitute a convenient or streamlined approach for others. However, it
has the advantage of shifting the bureaucratic burden onto governmental authorities
rather than companies, while applying local legislation and values.
These recent amendments relieved non-U.S.-based business entities from the previous
risk of violating domestic human rights legislation in an effort to maintain access to ITAR-
controlled articles. The shift to a "likelihood of diversion" analysis may signal a more
nuanced and less discriminatory approach to the USML-controlled-articles regime.
However, some non-U.S.-based entities allege that the amendments place the burden of
instituting extensive and potentially invasive screening practices squarely upon the shoul-
ders of end-users and local management.
VII. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States- Liability for Environmental Clean-
up on WW-H Era Defense Contracts
In ExxonMobil Corp. v. United States,89 an October 2011 case decided by the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, the Defense Supply Corporation (DSC) entered into aviation gas or
"avgas" contracts between oil refinery plants in Louisiana and Texas, owned by Humble
Oil & Refining Company and Standard Oil, the predecessor company to ExxonMobil and
DSC.9° Avgas allowed aircraft to fly with needed "power [and] speed" and was indispensa-
ble to the war effort. 91 This need drove the government to contract with refineries for
increased production.92 Excessive production resulted in large amounts of petroleum by-
products that could not be recycled. 93
In 1987, the State of Louisiana issued a Corrective Action Order directing ExxonMobil
to conduct environmental cleanup at its Baton Rouge refinery.94 In 1995, the State of
Texas issued an Agreed Order for cleanup of ExxonMobil's Baytown refinery. 95 Exx-
onMobil incurred cleanup costs as a result and sought reimbursement from the U.S. Gen-
87. Id. at 2-3.
88. See U.S. Dep't of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Guidelines for Preparing Electronic
Agreements, Version 3 (2011) 23, available at http://pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/documents/PreparingElec-
tronciAgreements-Guidelines.pdf.
89. ExxonMobil Corp. v. United States, Nos. 09-265C & 09-882C, 2011 WL 5143229 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 31,
2011).
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *2, *4, n.3.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id.
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eral Services Administration (GSA) under 41 U.S.C. § 114 (a). The GSA did not respond,
and ExxonMobil filed suit.
96
ExxonMobil argued the government breached its contract by failing to reimburse Exx-
onMobil for cleanup costs. 9 7 Citing Shell Oil Co. v. United States,9s ExxonMobil argued
environmental cleanup costs were covered "charges" under the "Taxes" clause in its World
War 11 (WW-I1) contracts. 99
The Shell case contained similar facts to ExxonMobil. Shell Oil Company contracted
with the government during WW-H1 to produce avgas °° Also, the "Taxes" clause in Shell
was identical to the clause in ExxonMobil.101 In Shell, the court relied on several dictionary
definitions of the word "charges" to reach the conclusion that the term included environ-
mental cleanup liability.102 The court reasoned "CERCLA103 liability, while not contem-
plated by the parties at the time the contract was signed, was clearly a new charge which
was contemplated by parties under the language of the contracts."' ° 4 In addition to the
"plain meaning" argument, the court seemed particularly swayed by the urgency of pro-
ducing avgas to aid the war effort and the lack of alternatives for hazardous waste dispo-
sal.' 05 It concluded, therefore, that the "Taxes" clause provided for costs incurred due to
post-production environmental cleanup. 0 6
The government in ExxonMobil argued that "charges" should not include environmen-
tal cleanup costs because there was no "nexus to the contract," 10 7 and a finding that the
word charges includes environmental cleanup would expose the government to "open-
ended indemnity."' 0s The government further argued the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA)
barred the term "charges" from including such costs. 109 As in Shell, the ExxonMobil court
rejected these arguments. Quoting Shell, the court held that the "Taxes" clause "did not
limit reimbursement to costs imposed only during contract performance."" 0
The government attempted to distinguish the case from Shell, arguing the "uncalculated
amount of waste prevented the court from concluding that the waste was produced 'by
reason of the avgas."' "" The court disagreed. 112 A September 1, 1943, Report of the
Petroleum Administration for War on the 100 Octane Aviation Gasoline Program, stated
that the "avgas production process result[ed] in various by-products that could not be
96. Id.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 439 (Fed. Cl. May 27, 2010).
99. ErxonMobil, 2011 WL 5143229, at -3.
100. Shell Oil, 93 Fed. Cl. at 441.
101. Id. at 444.
102. Id.
103. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
(Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2002).
104. Shell Oil, 93 Fed. Cl. at 444.
105. Id. at 445.
106. Id. at 446.
107. ExxonMobil, 2011 WVL 5143229, at *3.
108. Id.
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recycled for other purposes because all production was focused solely on avgas."" 3 Be-
cause the government was aware of such a consequence, the court found that it was lia-
ble.1 4 The court concluded that the "very purpose of the ["Taxes" clause] was to remove
the potential risks any reasonable producer would be reluctant to take on" and doing so
"ignores the plain language of the clause.""I Finally, quoting Shell, the court rejected the
government's ADA argument." 6 In Shell, the court held that Executive Order 9001 and
the War Powers Act "authorized open-ended indemnification agreements.",117
The holdings in Shell and ExxonMobil make a breach of contract claim a viable avenue of
recovery for environmental cleanup costs for government contractors. While both Shell
and ExxonMobil involved WW-II production of avgas and its byproducts, the court's inter-
pretation of the "Taxes" clause would likely extend to other contaminants and possibly
other wartime periods.
VIII. Proposed Changes to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Aerospace and defense contractors have recently-and for good reason-fortified their
compliance programs in response to a dramatically stepped-up Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) enforcement regime. Increased enforcement activity on the part of twin-en-
forcers United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) has prompted close examination of how best to limit company risk profiles
in this highly charged area. Although the industry has proposed a number of reforms to
the current statutory regime-driven largely by a perceived lack of clarity in how the
FCPA applies in various situations-the Administration has repeatedly signaled its stout
resistance to such changes. These signals certainly have been mixed, and mainly have
been based on the arguable 1 8 notion that such domestic reform, even if called for, would
send the "wrong signal" to the rest of the world, which views the United States as a leader
in the anti-corruption fight.
On the one hand, few would disagree with Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Lanny A.
Breuer's November 8, 2011, comments, delivered at the 26th National Conference on the
FCPA, that "[tihere are few more destructive forces in society than the effect of wide-
spread corruption on a people's hopes and dreams, and I believe it is incumbent upon us to
work as hard as we can to eradicate corruption across the globe."" 9 That said, supporting the
113. ErxonMobil, 2011 WL 5143229, at *4, n.3.




118. See generally T. Markus Funk and M. Bridget Minder, The FCPA in 2011 and Beyond: Is Targeted
FCPA Reform Really the "Wrong Thing at the Wrong Time?," Bloomberg Law Reports (2012) (" [G]ood
public policy and due process considerations counsel that, when we evaluate the sufficiency of a criminal
statute such as the FCPA, we should not leave problem areas unreformed simply because of the possibility
that such reforms are capable of being misconstrued by foreign observers. Indeed, for those of us personally
experienced in the challenging effort to promote the rule of law in developing and post-conflict jurisdic-
dons-that is, those countries in which corruption is most rampant-the notion that, as a rule, slight adjust-
ments to U.S. law could cause wholesale abandonment of reform efforts elsewhere is subject to dispute.").
119. Lamy A. Breuer, Assoc. Attorney Gen., Speech at the 26th National Conference on the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, U.S. Dep't. of Justice (Nov. 8, 2011) http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/
crm-speech-l 11 108.html.
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concept and objectives of the FCPA does not necessarily require one to support every
present provision of the FCPA.
Indeed, 2011 has been nothing if not the year of calls for reform. The influential U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and other industry groups have led the charge, as have members
of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section. 120 Moving from the general
to the specific, recent calls for FCPA reform have called on Congress to:
1. Include within the Act an affirmative defense based upon a company's "adequate
compliance procedures." The idea here is to allow industry to rely on good cor-
porate governance and a robust culture of compliance in order to provide them
some protection.
2. Limit the successor liability of companies that, after conducting appropriate due
diligence, nevertheless acquire or merge with a company that was (unbeknownst
to the acquirer) involved in conduct that violated the FCPA. The proposed re-
form would protect law-abiding companies from the difficult-to-control actions
of rogue employees of partners in transactions.
3. Clarify the scope of the FCPA's imposition of civil liability for the offending acts
of a company's subsidiary that are unknown to it. As with the above proposal, the
idea is to protect companies from liability for conduct of which they are unaware
and for which they are not responsible.
4. More clearly define the term "foreign official" and, specifically, to provide a clear
definition of "instrumentality" government (many proposals identify "operational
control" as the appropriate touchstone). 121
The call for reform, however, has not been unchallenged. Not only have academics
rushed to the defense of the FCPA as currently written, 122 but DOJ itself has left little
doubt that it does not support reform-at least for now.
In his November 8 comments, for example, AAG Breuer responded to calls for reform
by a wide range of industry groups and former prosecutors-including former Attorney
General Michael Mukasey on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce-by stating that
"[t]his is precisely the wrong moment in history to weaken the FCPA."123 Breuer also
mentioned that the government has "no intention whatsoever of supporting reforms
whose aim is to weaken the FCPA and make it a less effective tool for fighting foreign
bribery."' 124 According to Breuer, "watering down" the FCPA-for instance, by removing
the successor liability component-would only serve "to send exactly the wrong message"
to countries that view the United States as an anti-corruption role model. 25
120. See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Restoring the
Balance: Proposed Amendments of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2010), http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/restoring-balance-proposed-amendments-to-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.htm; ABA
Ponders FCPA Reform, FCPA Professor (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/aba-ponders-fcpa-
reform.
121. Weissmann & Smith, supra note 120, at 7.
122. See David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global Momentum of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SocIETY FOUNDATION, (Sept. 2011), http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washing-
ton/articles.publications/publications/busting-bribery-201 10916/Busting%2OBribery2O lSeptember.pdf.
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Signaling what some have interpreted as an implicit admission that calls for reform may
be justified, AAG Breuer during the same event also commented that, "whether or not
certain clarifications to the Act are appropriate, now is the time to ensure that the FCPA
remains a strong tool for fighting the ill effects of transnational bribery."126 Commenta-
tors have noted that the notion of prioritizing legitimate domestic law reform behind
foreign policy "signaling" reflects a distinct shift in DOJ thinking. Breuer, arguably fur-
ther supporting critics' claims that the FCPA is not as clear as the government has long
asserted, further promised that in 2012, DOJ will release "detailed new guidance on the
Act's criminal and civil enforcement provisions." 127 Close monitoring of the anticipated
2012 developments in this ever-shifting, risky area of the law is certainly worth the atten-
tion of the aerospace and defense industry.
IX. DFARS Business Systems Rule
Following an initial proposed rule, 28 a revised proposed rule, 129 and the Ike Skelton
NDAA,130 the DoD issued an interim rule effective May 18, 2011, amending the DFARS
to require inclusion of the Contractor Business Systems clause in covered contracts in
order to improve the effectiveness of DoD oversight of contractor business systems.
The Contractor Business Systems clause (DFARS 252.242-7005) applies to CAS cov-
ered contracts13 ' and contracts that include one or more of the following DFARS clauses:
DFARS 252.215-7002, Cost Estimating System Requirements; DFARS 252.234-7002,
Earned Value Management System; DFARS 252.242-7004, Material Management and
Accounting System; DFARS 252.242-7006, Accounting System Administration; DFARS
252.244-7001, Contractor Purchasing System Administration; and DFARS
252.245-7003, Contractor Property Management System Administration. A contract that
is not subject to CAS is still covered by the rule if it contains at least one of these six
individual business system clauses.' 32
A contractor's business systems must be "acceptable" (i.e., comply with the terms of the
contract)133 and not have any significant deficiencies. A significant deficiency is a "short-
coming in the system that materially affects the ability of officials of the [DoD] to rely
upon information produced by the system that is needed for management purposes.' 34 If
the contracting officer (CO) determines that there is a "significant deficiency" in a con-
tractor business system, the CO may withhold, under one or more contracts containing
the Business Systems clause, a percentage of payments due, 135 including (a) interim pay-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Defense Acquisition Regulations System, 75 Fed. Reg. 3415 (Jan. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R.
pts. 215, 234, 242, 244, 252).
129. Defense Acquisition Regulations System, 75 Fed. Reg. 75550 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pts. 215, 234, 242, 244, 252).
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ments under cost-reimbursement contracts; incentive type contracts; time-and-materials
contracts; and labor-hour contracts; 136 (b) progress payments;137 and (c) performance-
based payments.' 38 Such withholding is not an exclusive remedy, nor does it waive the
government's other rights.' 39 Notably, payment under a fixed-price contract may not be
withheld where performance is complete and has been accepted by the government. 140
When the CO makes an initial determination of one or more significant deficiencies in
one or more of the contractor's business systems, the CO must notify the contractor ac-
cordingly, and the contractor has thirty days to respond."41 Thereafter, if the CO issues a
final determination with a notice to withhold payments based on one or more significant
deficiencies in a required contractor business system, the CO "will withhold five percent
of amounts due from progress payments and performance-based payments, and direct the
Contractor, in writing, to withhold five percent from its billings on interim cost vouchers
on cost, labor-hour, and time-and-materials contracts until the Contracting Officer has
determined that the contractor has corrected all significant deficiencies as directed by the
contracting officer's final determination."142 Five percent is the maximum withholding
for a significant deficiency in one contractor business system. 143 If there are significant
deficiencies in two or more contractor business systems, the maximum withholding is ten
percent. 144 The contractor has forty-five days to correct the deficiencies or submit an
acceptable corrective action plan to eliminate them.145
Upon timely submission of an acceptable corrective action and CO determination that
the contractor is effectively implementing it, the amounts withheld may be reduced to two
percent until the CO determines that all significant deficiencies have been corrected.46 If
the CO later determines the contractor has not followed the corrective action plan, the
percentages originally withheld will be reinstated until the CO determines that all signifi-
cant deficiencies have been corrected. 147
The contractor must notify the CO in writing once it corrects all the deficiencies.'14
The CO must then confirm all significant deficiencies are corrected.' 49 If so, withhold-
ings shall discontinue and the contractor may bill for money previously withheld.150 If
not, the withholdings continue. 15' If the CO does not make a determination within ninety
days, then the amount withheld must be reduced by at least fifty percent until the CO











146. See DFARS 252.242-7005(d)(2).
147. See DFARS 252.242-7005(d)(2).
148. See DFARS 252.242-7005(e)(1).
149. See DFARS 252.242-7005(e)(2).
150. See DFARS 252.242-7005(e)(2)(i).
151. See DFARS 252.242-7005(e)(2)(ii).
152. See DFARS 252.242-7005(e)(2)(iii).
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